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Keenan: Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CUSTODY LITIGATION:
THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
INTRODUCTION

Domestic violence and custody litigation are interrelated
problems that impose substantial burdens on society and on the
courts. Recently, a panel of legal and mental health professionals
convened in California to discuss the problem of domestic violence in
the context of custody disputes.' While expressing varying opinions
on specific issues, 2 the panelists generally agreed that evidence of
3
domestic violence must be considered in custody decisions.
An informed discussion of domestic violence and its relevance in
custody litigation requires an understanding of the scope of the problem. Wife beating 4 is a pervasive national problem," yet violence
against women is tolerated by the very authorities that have the ability to deal with the problem. 6 While the frequency and severity of
1. Panel, Domestic Violence and Custody - "To Ensure Domestic Tranquility," 14
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 623 (1984). The panel was composed of two judges with extensive
family law experience, a divorce research psychologist, a professor of social work and an attorney who has written many articles on domestic violence. Id. at 623-24.
2. Id. at 624-32. The panelists expressed differing views on joint custody and on
mediation.
3. See id. at 636-38.
4. In the overwhelming number of domestic violence cases, women are the victims. U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB:

BATTERED WOMEN AND THE AD-

MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, at V (1982) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE].
See M. PAGELOW, THE "CYCLE OF VIOLENCE" IN FAMILIES: FACT OR FICTION? 9, 18 (1982)

(indicating that the most severe and common type of spousal violence is wife beating and that
this is the violence most likely to be witnessed by children) (reprinted by the National Center
on Women and Family Law (NCOWFL)).
5. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, at II
(1978) [hereinafter cited as ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY]; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, Final Report, at iii, vi, 2-3 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE REPORT].

6. D. MARTIN, BATTERED VIvES chs. 6, 7 (1976). Wife battering became a criminal
offense for the first time in New York State in 1977. Berg & Pearlman, Mediation" Promises,
promises, in WIVES TALES at 3, 4 (Spring 1984) (a newsletter of the Park Slope Safe Homes
Project). A recent report by the Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence concluded
that:
These victims often are uniquely isolated. Friends who might otherwise be a source
of support hesitate to intrude on the privacy of "family matters" . . . . Reporting
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wife beating is shocking," the failure of police, prosecutors and the

judiciary to exercise punitive and preventive measures is equally astoundingY Many experts agree that the legal system fails to protect

battered wives. 9 Current policies and practices of police departments,
social service agencies and courts signal to both victims and batterers
that society is willing to tolerate acts within marriage that would
otherwise be prosecuted as assault, battery, aggravated assault, at-

tempted murder and rape. 10
Physical abuse of women by their spouses and lovers has recently received some attention in the media. This attention is partly

in shocked response to cases where desperate victims have retaliated
against their abusers.1 Drawing attention to the problem, however,
violence to authorities carries its own risks. All too often police, prosecutors or
judges minimize or ignore the problem and the victim is left alone to face an attacker who may respond with anger at being reported.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at iii-iv. See Brozan, Task Force
Urges Action Against Family Violence, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1984, at A25, col. 1.
7. Estimates of the incidence of wife beating range from at least one in three marriages, M. STRAUS, R. GELLES, S. STEINMETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY at 31 (1980), to up to one-half of all marriages. Woods, Litigation on
Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 39, 41 (1981). See D. MARTIN, supra
note 6; Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RTS.
L. REP. 138 (1977). See also P. HOFF. J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, INTERSTATE
POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW 3-15
(1982) (scope of wife battering and the extent of underreporting).
8. ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 12-60. The U.S. Commission on Civil
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING:

Rights concluded that the police, prosecutors, and the courts fail to protect battered women.
The Commission found that police practices, reflecting social and legal policy, include failure
to respond to domestic disturbance calls, non-arrest policies in inappropriate cases, channeling
criminal spousal assault cases into the civil courts and reporting practices that mask the nature
and frequency of the crime. Id. at 21-22. The Commission found that prosecutors often give
low priority to domestic violence cases, fail to prosecute or obtain convictions, often treat victims rather than defendants as the culpable party, hesitate to file charges, frequently attribute
low prosecution rates to uncooperative victims while discouraging the required cooperation,
rarely utilize subpoenas to acquire victim cooperation, and frequently charge abusers with
lesser crimes. Id. at 33-34. Regarding the courts, the Commission found misuse of available
civil and criminal remedies, imposition of lenient sanctions, failure to make civil orders of
protection available to battered women and failure to impose appropriate sanctions when such
orders are violated. Id. at 59-60. Additionally, the Commission found that mediation was generally an inappropriate remedy in domestic violence situations, id. at 70-76, that more funding
is needed for shelters, id. at 77-90, and that state legislation making protection orders available to battered wives is needed. Id. at 95.

9. Id. at ii, iv.
10. D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 87-88.
1i. See ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 5. A recent television docudrama,
NBC's The Burning Bed, based on the book by Faith McNulty, portrayed the story of
Francine Hughes, a battered wife who set fire to her husband as he lay sleeping. The story was
also the subject of a cover story in a popular magazine. Diliberto, A Violent Death, A
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is only the first step towards dealing with it. A massive and cooperative effort by law enforcement agencies, legislatures and the courts
will be required to deal with domestic violence in this country.
The need for reform is particularly urgent in the custody litigation context. Courts often fail to consider or give weight to evidence
of violence against the mother when evaluating the relative fitness of
the parents for custody. 12 Wives often cite physical violence in complaints for divorce, 13 but such complaints are frequently disregarded. 14 Implicit in the courts' refusal to consider wife beating is a
Haunted Life, PEOPLE, Oct. 8, 1984, at 100.

12.

Arbeitman, Wife Battering Seen As a Negative Indicator for Custody in Five

States, in THE WOMEN's ADVOCATE 3, 6 (May 1983) (a newsletter of the NCOWFL); NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., NCOWFL INSTITUTES A BATrERED
WOMEN AND CUSTODY PROJECT (1982) (news release) [hereinafter cited as NCOWFL Bat-

tered Women and Custody Project]. The National Center on Women and Family Law gathers
and distributes information on women and family law and publishes a bi-monthly newsletter,
THE WOMEN's ADVOCATE. In recent years, the Center has concentrated its resources on legal

advocacy for battered women. The position of the Center on battering and custody is that
battering is criminal conduct and per se evidence of the batterer's unfitness for custody. Id.
See also Bruner, For Alice, Divorce Didn't Stop Beatings, Jacksonville Journal, May 23, 1983,
at 1, col. 1 (judge awards joint custody to a father who had severely beaten the mother for
years both before and after the divorce); Letter from Dennis L. Arfmann, Nebraska attorney,
to Laurie Woods, Director of NCOWFL, in New York City (Feb. 17, 1981) (on file at
NCOWFL). This private attorney represented a battered woman in custody litigation but was
unable to convince the judge to consider evidence of the father's sexual assault on the mother
as relevant in determining custody. Id.
Client confidentiality prohibits attorneys from revealing the names of clients who have
been unsuccessful in having evidence of their abuse admitted or given weight in custody litigation. Attorneys who litigate extensively on behalf of battered women, however, attest to the
difficulty of convincing judges to consider this evidence. Joanne Schulman, staff attorney at the
National Center on Women and Family Law (NCOWFL), litigates nationally on behalf of
battered women and has published extensively in the area of women and family law. Ms.
Schulman states that battered women often lose custody because courts refuse to consider a
father's battering of the mother as evidence of his unfitness for custody. Telephone interview
with Joanne Schulman, staff attorney at NCOWFL (Feb. 19, 1985) (record on file at Hofstra
Law Review). See Blake v. Blake, 106 A.D.2d 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1984) (reversing family court award of joint legal custody, with physical custody to the batterer).
Meg O'Regan, managing attorney at the Center for Women's Rights in Mineola, New
York, states that in her experience, judges in New York generally admit evidence of spouse
abuse, but fail to give weight to the evidence. Ms. O'Regan reports that while her clients are
often awarded custody, they are unable to convince the court that the children's visitation with
their father should be restricted and strictly supervised. Ms. O'Regan attributes this to judicial
failure to recognize that the low impulse control of batterers is highly relevant to their fitness
as parents. Finally, Ms. O'Regan emphasizes that the women she represents, like most battered women, generally do not have the resources to finance an appeal. Telephone interview
with Meg O'Regan, managing attorney for the Center for Women's Rights (Feb. 19, 1985)
(record on file at Hofstra Law Review).
13. D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 14.
14. Id.; Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 151-53.
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failure to recognize that detriment to the children is inherent in the
beating of their mother, 15 and that the problem does not end with
separation or divorce.16
Several states have begun to take notice of the problem. The
Florida legislature, recognizing the relevance of battering in custody
litigation, has amended that state's joint custody statute to require
courts to "consider evidence of spouse abuse as evidence of detriment
to the child. 1' 7 In addition, five other states have statutes that address the issue of spousal violence in a custody context.' 8 This Note
analyzes existing statutory schemes and suggests specific revisions
designed to facilitate resolution of custody disputes where domestic
violence is a factor.
Evidence of wife beating should create a statutory presumption
of detriment to the child and of the abuser's unfitness for custody.' 9
This Note will discuss the negative effects suffered by the children of
battered women, the correlation between spouse and child abuse, 0
and the intergenerational aspects of family violence. 2 ' Finally, the
special problems faced by battered women in custody litigation, including the use of custody as a battering weapon 22 and the dangers
to battered women created by modern family law trends,23 will be
addressed.
I.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BATTERING AND CUSTODY

While attention to the problem of wife beating is a recent phenomenon, wife beating itself is not.24 For literally thousands of years
15. See infra notes 73-111 and accompanying text.
16.

See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.

17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). See Hirsch, New Florida
Legislation ProvidesProtectionfor Battered Women and Their Children in Custody Cases, in
THE WOMEN'S ADVOCATE at 1-2 (Sept. 1984).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(8) (1983); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4601.5 (West 1984); CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(4) (1984); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1980);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.270(2) (1984). See Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 3, 6.
19. See NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12.

20. See infra notes 73-86, 95-100 and accompanying text.
21.
22.

See infra notes 101-I I and accompanying text.
See infra notes 117-43 and accompanying text.

23. See infra notes 183-250 and accompanying text.
24. ISSUES oF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 5 (address by D. Martin). See Eisenberg
& Micklow, supra note 7, at 138-39 (describing the common law right of chastisement). See
also Davidson, Wifebeating: A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATTERED
WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE at 2-23 (M. Roy ed. 1977)

(providing an overview of the history of wifebeating from pre-biblical to modern times).
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women as well as children were considered the property of men.',
Men had absolute authority within the family unit; children, women
and servants were subject to "domestic chastisement."2 6 A husband's
legal right to physically chastise his wife was not repudiated in this
country until the end of the nineteenth century.

While most states

now have specific laws against wife beating, 28 violence against wives
continues at alarming rates. In the United States today, between two
and four thousand women are beaten to death by their husbands
29
each year.

The history of custody law in the United States reflects a traditional deference to paternal authority. Until the twentieth century, a

virtually irrebuttable presumption of the paternal right to custody
existed in this country. 30 A father could lose custody upon strong
proof of cruelty or unfitness but this rarely occurred. 31 Women were
economic non-entities, unable to support themselves or their children
after divorce and therefore could not afford to seek custody. 32 In ad-

dition, fathers had no legal duty to support children who were not in
their custody.3 3 This rule was based on the rationale that a father

deprived of the services of his children should not be required to
maintain them.34 While the tender years doctrine, which created a
preference for the mother in a dispute over custody of a very young
child, emerged by the end of the nineteenth century, 35 a correspond25. ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 5-6 (address by D. Martin).
26. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 77 (1984).
27. Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 7, at 139; Davidson, supra note 24, at 19-20. See
SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL 703 (R. Morgan ed. 1984). In 1871 Alabama and Massachusetts became the first states to outlaw wife battery. Id.
28. Lerman, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, 6 RESPONSE 1, 20-28 (Sept.-Oct.
1983).
29. See SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL, supra note 27, at 703-04. Additionally, approximately
two to six million women are beaten each year by their partners, and in 1979, 40% of all
women who were murdered were killed by their partners. Id.
30. Katz, The Maternal Preference and the Psychological Parent: Suggestions for Allocating the Burden of Proofin Custody Litigation, 53 CONN. B.J. 343, 345 (1979); Uviller,
Father'sRights and Feminism: The MaternalPresumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
107, 112-14 (1978).
31. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations,7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 235 (1982); Uviller, supra note 30, at 112.
32. Uviller, supra note 30, at 113.
33. Polikoff, supra note 31, at 235-36.
34. Uviller, supra note 30, at 112-13. Fathers were entitled to the services of their children and in return owed their children the duty of maintenance and support. Id. at 112.
35. Id. at 113. The premise of the tender years doctrine was that a very young child
needs the care of a mother. Id.
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ing duty of non-custodial fathers to support their children was not
widely accepted until some time between the 1920's3 6and the
1940's. 8 Thus, the presumption of maternal custody did not become
widespread until the second quarter of this century and has been in
decline since the 1970's. au

Although women and children are no longer the legal property
of men, female economic disadvantage and widespread domestic violence perpetuate an unequal power relationship between men and
women.39 In this context, application of a so-called "gender neutral"
custody standard has a discriminatory impact on women.40 Women
who seek custody of their children still find themselves at a tremendous economic disadvantage, 41 especially with child support orders
unrealistically low and rarely enforced.42 Furthermore, violence is
the ultimate tool for keeping women "subservient, dependent, concil36. Id.
37. Polikoff, supra note 31, at 236 n.9 (citation omitted).
38. See Infra notes 144-57 and accompanying text. Uviller, supra note 30, at 114-17;
Polikoff, supra note 31, at 236.
39. See Hart, Mediationfor Battered Women: Same Song, Second Verse - Little Bit
Louder, Little Bit Worse, at 10-11 (paper presented at New York University School of Law at
the Conference on Women and Mediation, Jan. 21-22, 1984) (asserting that "[v]iolence preserves mens' property rights in women," and that "[t]he risks of acting out violently against a
wife/partner are low," compared to "the risks of violence with others"). See also IssuEs OF
PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 228-77 (presentation by M. Fields, Wife-Beating Government Intervention Policies and Practices). Ms. Fields, attorney for Brooklyn Legal Services
Corporation Family Law Unit, describes how society's tolerance of wife beating deprives
women of their civil rights and civil liberties. Id.
40. See Neely, The Primary CaretakerParentRule: Child Custody and the Dynamics
of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 168 (1984). Neely discusses the unequal economic and
psychological bargaining power of women in divorce proceedings. He states that "the unpredictability of divorce proceedings can be used to terrorize women," id. at 177, and that
"[u]nder our purportedly sex-neutral system, women ... come out of divorce settlements with
the worst of all possible results: They get the children, but insufficient money ... to support
them." Id. at 178.
41. Woods, Been & Schulman, Sex and Economic Discriminationin Child Custody
Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130 (1983). Recent studies indicate that when fathers
seek custody, they prevail about two-thirds of the time. Id.; SISTERHOOD IS GLOBAL, supra
note 27, at 699. More mothers than fathers actually have custody by default. M. Pagelow,
supra note 4, at 14. See Neely, supra note 40, at 179 n. 17 (describing the economic hardships
of single mothers and resulting psychological stress).
42. SISTERHOOD ISGLOBAL, supra note 27, at 699. Morgan states that:
In 1981, of the over 8 million women raising children alone, only 59% had been
awarded any child support (of these, 72% actually received payment and only 47%
received the full amount). Average payments totaled $2106 per yr. but 60% received
less than $1500 (often to be used for more than 1 child). After 1 yr. of divorce, an
average woman's income drops 73% and a man's rises 42% (1982).
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iatory and obedient." 4 3 Violence, or the threat of it, can deter a woman from attempting to leave a relationship or can force her to
make economic concessions in exchange for custody. 44 Finally, state
reluctance to "intrude" upon the privacy of the marital relationship
deprives women of protection from abuse and preserves male authority. 45 Custody standards that fail to reflect the disadvantaged status
of women perpetuate patterns of discrimination.

II.

COURTS FAIL TO RECOGNIZE BATTERERS' UNFITNESS FOR
CUSTODY

Judicial opinions both reflect and advance social policies. The
reluctance to give sufficient weight to evidence of wife beating is
symptomatic of society's tolerance of violence by husbands against
wives. The conspicuous absence of discussion of wife beating in divorce and custody cases reflects social policy implemented by judicial
rulings that disallow evidence of fathers' violence towards mothers
on the issue of fitness for custody. 6
While judges may exercise discretion to exclude evidence of
spouse abuse in custody litigation,47 there are cases where courts are
compelled to deal with the issue of battering in a custody context.
Thus, the most extensive discussions of wife battering as bearing on
the batterer's fitness for custody appear in cases where the state has
sought to terminate the parental rights of fathers who have murdered the mothers of their children.4" These cases provide insight
into judicial policy and reasoning in this area.
In one such case, In re James M.,49 the California Court of Ap43. Hart, supra note 39, at 10.
44. See id. at 10-11; ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 10 (address by D.
Martin).
45. See ISSuES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 3-18 (address by D. Martin). See
also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 12 ("This underenforcement of the law tells victims and assailants alike that family violence is not really a serious
crime, if a crime at all. It is this widespread perception that has contributed to the perpetuation of violence within the family.").
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
48. See In re Sarah H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 326, 165 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1980); In re Geoffrey
G., 98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1979); In re James M., 65 Cal. App. 3d 254,
135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); In re Abdullah, 85 11. 2d 300, 423 N.E.2d 915 (1981). The fact
that the most extensive discussion of wife abuse in a custody context is found in cases where
the father's right to custody is jeopardized by his killing of the mother is especially ironic in
view of the low priority given to the protection of the victim's rights. See supra notes 6-10 and
accompanying text.
49. 65 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
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peals affirmed a lower court's dismissal of the state's petition to free
four children from the custody of their natural father. The father
had pled guilty to second degree murder after killing his former
wife, the children's mother, by stabbing her twenty-two times. 50 The
issues on appeal included whether the killing of the mother constituted cruel treatment of the children; 51 whether the conviction for
the murder of the mother was of such a nature as to prove unfitness;

and whether an award of custody to the father would be detrimental
to the children as a matter of law.5 2 The lower court found that the
nature of the murder did not prove the father's unfitness for the future custody of his children and that the children had not been cruelly treated or neglected.5 3 Finally, the court concluded that the welfare and best 5interests
of the children required dismissal of the
4
petition.
state's
The language and reasoning of the affirming court suggests that
the court viewed the defendant, rather than the deceased, as the victim. The court chose to emphasize the decedent wife's extramarital
5
affair and supposed manipulation of the defendant's love for her.
While the court conceded that the commission of some types of felonies could be sufficient to show unfitness for custody as a matter of
law, the court indicated that such a crime would require either evi50. Id. at 259, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
51. The relevant California statute provides that a child who has been cruelly treated or
neglected by a parent may be declared free of the custody and control of that parent under
certain circumstances. Id. at 263, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See CAL CIV. CODE § 232(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1985).
52. 65 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 227. The California statute set forth
additional grounds for termination of parental rights, where:
[the] parent . . . [is] convicted of a felony

. . .

of such nature as to prove the

unfitness of such parent . . . to have the future custody and control of the child, or
if any term of sentence of such parent. . . is of such length that the child will be
deprived of a normal home for a period of years.
Id. at 263-64, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 227 (quoting CAL CIv. CODE § 232(a)(4) (current version at
West Supp. 1985)).
53. Id. at 262, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
54. Id. at 262, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
55. Id. at 257-58, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 224. According to the court, the victim had "played
upon Sergio's love for her and led him to believe that they were reconciling." Id. at 258, 135
Cal. Rptr. at 224. This occurred after a final divorce decree. On the day the defendant stabbed
the victim, he was "[sitill gullible as to [her] intentions." Id. at 259, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
They argued after she refused to agree to return to him with the children. The court further
emphasized the defendant's testimony that the victim "directed the knife to her breast" and
may have "dared him to use it" and cited expert psychiatric testimony given at trial to the
effect that the victim may have had a death wish. Id.
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dence of depravity or involve "direct" abuse of the child.5 6 The court
suggested that "the murder of the mother of minor children could be
committed by their father in such circumstances as to prove . ..
unfitness . . .if the killing were accomplished in the presence of a
57

child."
The court's reasoning indicates a failure to recognize the effect
that such an event has on children, 58 and a reluctance to conclude
that a murderer may not be the proper parent for his own childrenThe court actually analogized the deprivation suffered by these children to that experienced by children whose parents get divorced.59
If In re James M. was an isolated case, it could be dismissed as
an aberration. Judicial tolerance towards wife abuse, however, is
more widespread than rare. 60 Significantly, the case has been cited

with approval in subsequent cases."' The California Court of Appeals, in In re Sarah H., 2 found unfitness in a father who murdered
the mother, but nevertheless cited James M. with approval.6 3 In
spite of the defendant's prior criminal record, his brutal beating to
56. Id. at 265-66, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
57. Id. at 266, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
58. The court failed to recognize that an act committed against the mother, but not
physically against the children, could nevertheless constitute direct cruelty to the children. The
court's reasoning that "[tihe concept of neglect in the statute connotes a failure on the part of
the neglecting parent in his . . . direct relationship with the child," id. at 266, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 229, misses the mark. The court noted that cruel treatment could be mental, but averred
that it "must be intended action or conduct directed to have an effect upon or reaction from a
child." Id. The court's articulation of the scienter requirement here would appear to excuse
even the father who murders the wife in view of the children, but without the intent or knowledge that they were witnessing the act. See infra notes 73-111 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 266, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
60. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
61. See In re Sarah H., 106 Cal. App. 3d 326, 329, 165 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62 (1980); See
also In re Geoffrey G., 98 Cal. App. 3d 412, 424, 159 Cal. Rptr. 460, 467 (1979) (Hopper, J.,
dissenting). The Geoffrey court affirmed a trial court's finding of a father's unfitness for custody where the defendant had pleaded nolo contendere to voluntary manslaughter after strangling the children's mother to death during an argument. The court considered the defendant's
criminal record of numerous arrests and convictions for intoxication, his prior failure to support his child, the fact that the defendant and decedent had never married, that the mother
received welfare for the child while the defendant had lived with the mother and child, and
that the three-year-old child was happy and well-adjusted, living with maternal grandparents.
98 Cal. App. 3d at 415-18, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 461-63. The dissent, however, cited In re James
M. for the proposition that killing the mother was not enough for a finding of unfitness and
suggested that a showing of a propensity to violent crime together with a showing that defendant did not hesitate to involve family members of a tender age in violent crime, and an
inability to make a living, might be required for such a finding. Id. at 424, 159 Cal. Rptr. at
467.
62. 106 Cal. App. 3d 326, 165 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1980).
63. Id. at 329, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
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death of the mother in view of the children, and testimony showing
that the children suffered psychological effects from witnessing the
murder, the concurring justice in Sarah H. felt that the case was a
"close one" and that the record was "replete with evidence that the
father had been a good father. 6a4 At least one intermediate appellate
court in another jurisdiction has utilized the reasoning of In re
8 a Pennsylvania trial court
James M.6" In Bartasavick v. Mitchell,"
removed a child from her grandparents' custody and returned her to

the custody of the father who had murdered her mother.67 The court
reasoned that "the permanence of the loss of [the] mother does not
necessarily render the father permanently incapable of parenting.""8
Children who have experienced the loss of their mother in this
manner are further victimized when they become the objects of protracted litigation. In 1975, a five-year-old boy who witnessed the
baseball bat slaying of his mother by his father went to live with his
aunt and uncle after his father was convicted of murder.6 9 Three
years later, the father was paroled and sued to regain custody of the
child.7 0 Despite the child's fear of his father and desire to remain
with his foster parents, litigation continued for three years before
custody was awarded to the foster parents.7 1 During this time the
64. Id. at 331-32, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 64.
65. In re Abdullah, 85 Il1. 2d 300, 423 N.E.2d 915 (1981). The Illinois intermediate
appellate court, reversing a circuit court, had held that the mere conviction of the father of the
stabbing murder of the mother, for which he received a sixty year sentence, was insufficient as
a matter of law for a finding of unfitness for custody. Id. at 302-03, 423 N.E.2d at 916-17.
The defendant had argued that the best interests of the child mandated a case by case determination and forbid a per se finding of depravity under the circumstances. The Supreme Court
of Illinois reversed, holding that the murder of the mother and the extended sentence established a prima facie case of depravity which the defendant could, but had failed to, rebut. Id.
at 305, 423 N.E.2d at 918. Regarding the fact that the victim was the child's mother, the
court emphasized that the "[d]efendant. . . deprived his son of his mother and further heightened the psychological scarring caused by a family already broken by divorce." Id.
66. 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
67. Id. The court overturned a trial court termination of the parental rights of the father
and held that the killing of a mother by a father is not sufficient by itself to warrant a finding
of abandonment of the child by the father. Id.
68. Id.
69. Nussbaum, Man Who Killed Wife Seeks Custody of Son, L.A. Times, April 2,
1981, at 1, col. 3.
70. Id. See Nussbaum, Custody Battle Lost by Wife Slayer, L.A. Times, April 4, 1981,
pt. 2, at 6, col. 3.
71. Newlund, Boy Has Become Legal Tug of War, Minneapolis Tribune, June 3, 1979,
at IA, col. 1. See Doctor Says Boy Should Remain in State, Minneapolis Tribune, Nov. 5,
1980, at 14B, col. 1. See In re Mullins, 298 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. 1980). In this opinion, the
court addressed only the issue of which state, California or Minnesota, had jurisdiction to
decide the custody issue.
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child and his foster parents suffered economically and emotionally
72
from the effects of extensive interstate custody litigation.
These cases demonstrate the critical need for statutory reform.

Clearly, judicial discretion is not sufficient to protect the interests of
battered women and children. The cases are disturbing in several
respects. They indicate a judicial willingness to strain to protect the
parental rights of batterers and convey the message that society is
willing to excuse violence within the family more readily than violence in other contexts. Just as important, the best interests of the
children are jeopardized by allowing violent men to have custody.
III.

RELEVANCE OF SPOUSE ABUSE IN A CUSTODY CONTEXT

Abuse of mothers is detrimental to children regardless of

whether the children are physically abused themselves or actually
witness the violence." The batterer's violence his wife should not be
viewed as distinct from his relationship with his children, since
spouse abuse injures children both directly and indirectly. 4 The ef-

fects of spouse abuse on children include actual and potential emotional" and physical harm, 78 the negative effects of exposure to an
inappropriate role model,77 and the potential for future harm where
contact with the batterer continues.78
A. Spouse Abuse is Child Abuse
Lenore Walker, recognized by both academicians and the judi72. Kramer, Boy Fearful About Meeting Father Who Killed His Mother, Minneapolis
Tribune, March 18, 1981, at IA, col. 1. See generally Neely, supra note 40, at 175-76 (discussing the damaging effects of custody litigation on children).
73. NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY LAW, INC., LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR
BATTERED WOMEN at 82-83 (1983) (manual). The authors assert that continuous contact with
an abusive parent is not in the best interest of children and express the view that "abuse of
mothers should be viewed by courts as a primary factor in determining contested custody." Id.
at 82 (emphasis in original). See WOMEN's LEGAL DEFENSE FUND & COLUMBUS COMMUNITY
LEGAL SERVICES, LEGAL REMEDIES FOR DOMEsTIC RELATIONS CRISES IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA: A MANUAL FOR ATTORNEYS, at 94-95 (rebutting the argument that where fathers
are not violent towards the children, the violence toward the mother should not be a factor in a
custody determination).
74. See infra notes 79-116 and accompanying text. See also Thomas, Custody Litiga-

tion Strategiesfor Battered Women, reprinted in NATIONAL CENTER ON WOMEN AND FAMILY
LAW CHILD CUSTODY PROJECT at 142-47 (Oct. 1983) (information release No. 5) (describing
the effect of domestic violence on children and the characteristics of battered women that
make them better parents than batterers).
75. See infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
77. Thomas, supra note 74, at 146.
78. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
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ciary as an expert in the area of wife abuse, 79 describes violence in
the home as a form of nonphysical child abuse.8 0 In addition to suffering physical and emotional effects themselves,"" children are deprived of attention and care when their mothers are battered. At
best, a battered woman's ability to care for her children is impaired. 2 Battered women suffer from an array of symptoms that
may include depression, low self-esteem, low energy and feelings of
helplessness. 83 Additionally, many women are bed-ridden or hospitalized regularly as a result of physical injuries.8 4 Decreased interaction
between the mother and children can be expected in these circumstances.8 5 Since battering is the direct cause of this deprivation, wife
abuse should also be considered a form of child abuse.86
B. Emotional Harm Suffered by Children
Even children who are not physically abused themselves are
traumatized by wife beating. 7 Assaults against women in the home,
79. Brief and Appendix of Amici Curiae, ACLU of New Jersey and the New Jersey
Coalition for Battered Women, State v. Kelly, No. A-2256-80-T4 (App. Div. July 6, 1982),
478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984). Lenore Walker testified as an expert on wife abuse in at least
twenty-five cases. Id. at Appendix B.
80. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 59 (1979). In Walker's study, 87%

of the women reported that children were aware of violence in the home; 53% of men who
abused their partners abused their children as well, while an additional one-third threatened
such abuse. Id.
81. See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
82. Westra & Martin, Children of Battered Women, 10 MATERNAL-CHILD NURSING J.
41, 49 (1981). See R. E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 110-11 (1979);
Hilberman, Overview: The "Wife-Beater's Wife" Reconsidered, 137 AM. J. Psychiatry 1336,
1341-42 (1980); Prescott & Letko, Battered Women: A Social PsychologicalPerspective, in
BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 24,
at 72, 84 (describing the physical injuries and emotional distress experienced by battered
women).
83. See R.E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 82, at 11; Hilberman, supra note 82,
at 1341-42; Prescott & Letko, supra note 82, at 84; Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at 49.
84. R.E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 82, at 110-11. See Hilberman, supra note
82, at 1340-41; See also Bruner, supra note 12, at 1 (a battered wife describes repeated beatings that resulted in severe injuries requiring hospitalization).
85. Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at 49.
86. L. WALKER, supra note 80, at 59. See Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at 50.
Westra and Martin note that the child in a family where there is abuse against the woman is
exposed to the same environment as the battered child and is just as likely to live in fear. Id.
See also Hilberman & Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT'L J. 460,
462 (1977) (children are likely to see or hear violence directed against their mother); Pagelow,
Children in Violent Families: Direct and Indirect Victims, in YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR
FAMILIES at 47-48 (S. Hill and B.J. Barnes eds. 1982) (exposure to physical force against a
loved one is "indirect abuse").
87. D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 22. See Thomas, supra note 74, at 143A-145;
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including beating and rape, occur most often at night and on weekends.88 As a result, children are likely to witness these attacks. Even
where children do not directly witness the attacks, they are deeply
affected by the climate of violence in their home. 9 This trauma can
result in immediate reactions of shock, fear, and guilt, 90 longer lasting impairment of self-esteem,91 and impairment of developmental
and socialization abilities. 2 While there is a need for more research
documenting the effects of wife abuse on children, problems ranging
from below normal cognitive, verbal, motor and quantitative abilities, 93 to anxiety, depression and social deviancy 94 have been observed in the children of battered women.
C.

Increased Risk of Physical Harm to Children

In addition to suffering personality and developmental detriment, children who are exposed to family violence suffer an increased risk of physical injury. 5 Children whose mothers are beaten

are not only more likely to be the objects of physical attack themselves, they may be injured by their proximity to the attacks.9 6 In
Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1340-41 (children traumatized by the climate of violence);
Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1 (abusers often force children to watch the violence).
88. Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1340; Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.
89. Pagelow, supra note 86, at 53-55.
90. D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 22.
91. Thomas, supra note 74, at 143A.
92. Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at 42-50.
93. Id. at 52; See L. WALKER, supra note 80, at 62-63.
94. Pfouts, Schopler & Henley, Jr., Deviant Behaviors of Child Victims and Bystanders
in Violent Families, in EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHILD ABUSE AND DELINQUENCY 79, 95-97 (R.J. Hunter & Y.E. Walker eds. 1981).
95. Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1337; Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 463;
Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at 50; See Roy, A Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DoMESTIc VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at
25, 33. In Roy's study, 45% of the assaults on women included assaults on children. Id. See
also Pagelow, supra note 86, at 55-57; Prescott & Letko, supra note 82, at 81; Thomas supra
note 74, at 145; Varma, Battered Women: Battered Children, in BATTERED WOMEN: A
PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at 263, 264. But see
R.E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 82, at 150. The authors concluded that most wife
batterers do not beat their children. They noted that while 20% of the men in the study did
punch at least one of their children very hard, most of the violence suffered by the children
was either the result of the child's attempt to intervene on behalf of the mother or resulted
from the child's proximity to blows directed at the mother. Id. Dobash and Dobash also emphasized that concern for the children of battered wives should not obscure the fact that the
woman is the primary victim. Id. at 155.
96. R.E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, supra note 82, at 150; Pagelow, supra note 86, at 5556. See P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 3-15; LEGAL
ADVOCACY FOR BATTERED WOMEN.

supra note 73, at 83 (citation omitted); NCOWFL Bat-

tered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 2.
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addition, older children can be injured when they attempt to intervene on behalf of their mother.9 7 Battering also tends to increase
during pregnancy9 s and can result in injury or death to the fetus.99
This type of abuse is not solely spouse abuse: It is child abuse as
well. 100 Wife battering is strong evidence of the batterer's reckless
disregard for the safety and welfare of his children; batterers should
be charged with knowledge of the risk their behavior entails.
D. IntergenerationalAspect of Family Violence
While the emotional or physical manifestations of harm suffered
by children of batterers are alarming, the cyclical nature of family
violence may be the phenomenon with the most far-reaching implications for society. Simply stated, violent tendencies may be passed on
from one generation to the next. 101 From battering fathers, children
receive direct messages condoning violent behavior and abuse of
women.10 2 A child's propensity for future violence is likely to increase as a result of witnessing violence between parents and from
exposure to an aggressive male parent as a role model.103 Children in
violent families learn to use physical violence as an outlet for anger
and are more likely to resort to violence as a means for resolving
conflicts or displaying power.104 The abuser himself is likely to have
10 5
come from a violent home.
The transmission of violent tendencies may be a sex-specific
97.

Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1340; Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.

98. Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1340; Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.
See Roy, supra note 95, at 42 (pregnancy as catalyst to violent episodes). But some women do

report less abuse with pregnancy. Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.
99. Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1340; Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.
100. See Hilberman & Munson, supra note 86, at 462.
101. Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1337, 1340-41. See Pfouts, Schopler, & Henley, Jr.,
supra note 94, at 95; Thomas, supra note 74, at 144-45; Westra & Martin, supra note 82, at
50. See also Varma, supra note 95, at 263 (on family violence as a self-perpetuating
phenomenon).
102. LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 73, at 83. Batterers exhibit
personality traits and engage in behaviors that, if committed against strangers outside of the

home, would raise serious questions about the suitability of these men as role models for their
children. Id.
103. Pagelow, supra note 86, at 64-66; infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. See
also STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT. THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, ADDRESSING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR SCHOOL PERSONNEL (1982) (booklet issued to
New York State school personnel) [hereinafter cited as STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT].
104. STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT, supra note 103.
105. Id.; Hilberman, supra note 82, at 1337. See S. STEINMETZ & M. STRAUS, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY (1974) at 259. See also Goleman, Study Says Aggressive Child is
Father to Aggressive Child, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1984, at B5, col. 3.
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phenomenon.10 6 Thus, boys may be more likely to imitate the violent
behavior of their fathers' 07 while girls tend to become passive and
withdrawn' 08 and may learn to use sexuality as a way to win their
father's approval. 09
Children who observe violence in the home may be more likely
to imitate that behavior than children who suffer direct physical
abuse. While the extent to which a child raised in a violent home
will be likely to abuse his own spouse will vary according to the reinforcement he receives for imitating the aggressive parent,"x0 at least
one expert has concluded that boys who observed paternal violence
were more likely to become violent than boys who were themselves
victims of either maternal or paternal violence."'
Messages implicit in the batterer's behavior encourage children
to develop characteristics that perpetuate the very roles and relationships that fuel family violence. The batterer as a negative role model
for children should be considered in conjunction with the array of
other negative effects suffered by children from exposure to domestic
violence.
E. Violence Does Not End With Divorce or Separation
The negative effects of spouse abuse on children do not vanish
when parents divorce. Judges may consider spouse abuse irrelevant
in a divorce context because they assume that the violence will end
106.

Pagelow, Violence in Families:

Is There An Intergenerational Transmission? 15-

17 (1982) (paper prepared for presentation at the 1982 annual meeting of the Society for the
Study of Social Problems in San Francisco, California) (reprinted by NCOWFL). Dr.
Pagelow, who has written extensively on the intergenerational aspect of family violence, asserts
that the intergenerational model should be focused and controlled for greater scientific accu-

racy, to account for differences based on the sex of the batterers and victims and whether the
affected person was a witness to, or victim of, the violence. Id.
107. Pagelow, supra note 86, at 64.

108.

Id. at 64-65.

109.

Id. at 57, 65. Pagelow notes that the adult male has the highest status in the family

and his behavior is thus more likely to be imitated by both girls and boys. Since girls are less
likely to be rewarded for aggressive behavior, they are unlikely to deviate from their sex roles

without special inducements. Id. at 64-65. Like boys, however, girls may choose to identify
with the father and turn against the mother. Girls may become susceptible to "seductive"

fathers in order to win favor with the power figure in the family. Id. Some experts have noted
that a higher than average rate of incest victims exists among the children of battered women.
L. WALKER, supra note 80, at 65.
110. See Pagelow, supra note 86, at 64-66.
111. Pagelow, supra note 106, at 15-16; Pagelow, supra note 4, at 11. According to

social learning theory, the home is the optimal environment for children to learn behavior
patterns. Pagelow, supra note 86, at 65.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

. [Vol. 13:407

with the divorce or separation. 1 2 Abuse may actually increase, however, when the woman asserts her independence. 13 Several experts
have noted that when a woman attempts to assert her autonomy or
defend herself, either within the relationship or by leaving, physical
assaults against her escalate.11 4 Batterers are also more likely to attempt to kidnap the children at this time. 1 5 As a batterer's violence
towards an estranged or ex-wife escalates, both the woman and children are at risk during unsupervised visitation periods, during transfers of the children for visitation, and through shared custody arrangements.1 1 6 If the courts fail to recognize the continued risk of
harm to the woman or children from the batterer, they will not make
provisions for supervision during visitation or for the protection of
the woman exposed to contact with the batterer while transferring
the children.
IV.

THE USE OF CUSTODY LITIGATION AS A WEAPON

Custody litigation, or the threat of it, has become an additional
weapon for batterers to use against their victims. Since economic dependency is a key factor preventing battered women from escaping
the battering situation, 117 the batterer's ability to use the threat of a
112. ISSUES OF PUBIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 229, 259 (presentation by M. Fields);
See Id. at 215 (presentation by D. Martin, Overview - Scope of the Problem). Martin states
that:
If a woman does manage to get away and obtains a divorce, she still has no guarantee of safety. Some ex-husbands continue to stalk and hunt down "their" women for
years after a divorce, forcing their victims to move and change jobs continually.
Despite the danger, judges continue to grant violent fathers visitation rights, and
thus the opportunity to further intimidate their ex-wives.
Id. See also Bruner, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing court grant of joint custody to a particularly vicious batterer and his wife).
113. Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1. See Bruner, supra note 12, at 1; Lee, Violence in the
Home, KPFA FOLIO, Berkeley, Cal. (Aug.-Sept. 1983) at 7; Shainess, PsychologicalAspects
of Wifebattering, in BATTERED WOMEN:

A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC ViO-

LENCE, supra note 24, at 111, 116. See also In re James M., 65 Cal. App. 3d 254, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 222. In James M., the husband threatened his wife with a knife when she filed for
divorce and stabbed her to death after the divorce was final. Id. at 258-59, 135 Cal. Rptr. at
224-25.
114.

See, e.g., D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 76-79. The "threat of both physical and

psychic withdrawal of love" may trigger violence in batterers. Id. at 46. See also R.E. DOBASH
& R. DOBASH, supra note 82, at 109. Fear of reprisal may deter victims from calling the
police. Roy, supra note 95, at 35.
115. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 15-7.
116. ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 5, at 215. See Woods, Been & Schulman,
supra note 41, at 1134.
117. D. MARTIN, supra note 6, at 83-85. Martin emphasizes that lack of money entraps

affluent wives as well as the wives of poorer men, since they may have just as little control of
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custody fight as a weapon is particularly effective. First, victims of
abuse are unlikely to be able to afford legal fees."1 " This enables the
batterer to use the threat of custody litigation to keep the woman

from leaving the home. When a battered woman is forced to remain
in a relationship due to the combined threat of poverty and the loss
of her children, both the woman and children are victimized by continued exposure to violence.
Secondly, a battered woman may make economic concessions in
order to retain custody, 11 9 only to find herself defending against a
motion for modification later when her poverty is considered by the
court as grounds for a change of custody to the more affluent parent.
In In re Marriage of Day,12 for example, a mother accepted a re-

duced property settlement in exchange for the father's offer to give
her custody of the children. 121 Such willingness to bargain away
or access to the family's money. Id. See Gelles, No Place to Go: The Social Dynamics of
Marital Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIoLENCE, supra note 24, at 46; Roy, supra note 95, at 43. See also International Association of

Chiefs of Police Training Key No. 245, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 24, at 144, 146 [hereinafter cited as Police Training Key No. 245].
118. See Police Training Key No. 245, supra note 117, at 146. This manual states that:
Economic dependence is perhaps the single most common reason why many abused
wives choose to stay within a violent marriage. This is especially true of violent
homes where the husband tries to maintain the wife's dependency through economic
control ....
Most abused wives do not possess marketable skills that could be used to establish financial independency. But even those wives who are principal providers or who
earn supplemental incomes can. . . be financially trapped within a violent marriage
when their husbands control the family's finances.
Id.
119. Cf. Hart, supra note 39, at 3 (batterers force property and support concessions
from their wives in exchange for promises to remove themselves from the home).
120. 314 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1982). In this case the husband offered custody to the
mother contingent on her acceptance of his offer for a property settlement. A year and a half
later he filed for modification of the custody decree and was awarded custody after alleging
that the mother spent too much time away from the children. Id. at 417. The father also
argued that the mother had wrongfully removed the children from the state without first informing him of the move. Id. at 420. The mother had been previously battered by the father,
who carried a gun and had declared, "I will not stop bothering you until you or I are dead."
Id. at 419. The mother had left the state with the children when her new husband's job required that they move to Kentucky. The fear of her ex-husband's violent reaction and potential
emotional harm to the children led to her decision not to discuss the move with him first. In
this case, the court, while not condoning the mother's secretive move with the children, concluded that her fears were reasonable, and affirmed the intermediate appellate court's reversal
of the district court's award of custody to the father. Id. at 421.
121. Id. at 417.
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spousal or child support and equitable distribution of marital property in exchange for safety and custody of the children is not
atypical.' 2 2
Where battered women do litigate for custody, they may be penalized for lifestyles that originate from their status as battered
women. Batterers frequently support their claims for custody by al23
leging that their victims are too unstable to care for the children .
Battered women may appear unstable when they move frequently to
avoid the attacks 2 4 or for economic reasons. 2 5 A mother may be
deemed "uncooperative" about visitation when she attempts to avoid
exposure to continued threats or beatings from the father. 2 6 Ironically, if the woman has remained in the violent situation or attempted to leave and returned, this may be cited as further evidence
of emotional instability. 127 Finally, the woman is likely to be suffering from genuine emotional problems caused by the beatings.128
When courts fail to consider evidence of spouse abuse as relevant to
fitness for custody, 29 the battered woman may lose custody as a result of problems caused by the abuse itself.'3 0
Even where the victim's charges of abuse are admissible, she
may be prejudiced in certain situations by the fact that she made the
allegations.' 3 ' For example, California includes a "friendly parent"
122. Hart, supra note 39, at 10-11; Lefcourt, Women, Mediation & Family Law, 18
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 266, 268-69 (1984).
123. NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 1; Thomas,
supra note 74, at 157-59.
124. NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 1; Thomas,
supra note 74, at 157-59. See also In re Cline, 433 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (battered
woman leaves state with child).
125. NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 1.
126. Id.; Thomas, supra note 74, at 159.
127. Thomas, supra note 74, at 158. See generally, ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra
note 5, at 258-59 (judge more critical of victim's failure to take action earlier than of batterer's violence).
128. Thomas, supra note 74, at 158-59.
129. See supra note 12.
130. The family court, Jefferson County, New York, awarded joint custody of two children, with physical custody to the father because the court concluded that the shelter for
battered women, to which the mother had fled, was not an adequate facility for children. Blake
v, Blake, 106 A.D.2d 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1984). The appellate division reversed, holding
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct "a full and complete hearing."
Id. at 880. See Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 3; NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody
Project, supra note 12, at 2.
131. See Thomas, supra note 74, at 157, 160 (batterers often argue that the victim's
allegations of violence are exaggerated or unfounded).
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provision in its joint custody statute,13 2 giving preference in a sole
custody award to the parent most likely to encourage contact be-

tween the children and the other parent.133 Because of the "friendly
parent" provision, the California statute places the burden of proof
on the party opposing joint custody."" Michigan's custody statute
creates a presumption favoring joint custody that can only be overcome by "clear and convincing evidence.113 5 A battered woman risks
losing custody altogether if she fails to meet this stringent burden of
proof.136 If the woman was previously reluctant to seek help or if the
police failed to respond, this burden can be insurmountable.137 When
the evidence consists largely of the woman's testimony against that

of her husband, the myth that women fabricate allegations of abuse
can operate against the woman in a custody dispute. 8
Battered women are especially disadvantaged in custody litigation when the courts consider the relative economic positions of the
parents.13 9 Recently, this factor has been given significant weight by
132. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
133. See Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Custody: Analysis of Legislation and its Implicationsfor Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.538, 554-56
(1982).
134. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600.5(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985). See Schulman & Pitt, supra
note 133, at 556-60.
135. MicH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.26a (Supp. 1985). See Schulman & Pitt, supra
note 133, at 551-53, 556-58.
136. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 554-56, 558-60. The battered woman who
attempts to raise her mate's violence as grounds to rebut the presumption of joint custody is
the "unfriendly parent" to the extent that she voices concern about unsupervised contact of the
children with the batterer. Letter from Joanne Schulman, NCOWFL staff attorney, to Ada
Shen-Jaffe, Evergreen Legal Services, Everett Washington (Sept. 4, 1980) (discussing joint
custody legislation).
137. The victim may actually have difficulty corroborating her allegations due to her
prior reluctance to seek help, Thomas, supra note 74, at 160, or the failure of authorities to
respond. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text.
138. See generally Lindsey, Mute Girl's Story: Child Abuse and the System, N.Y.
Times, May 12, 1984, at 45, col. 1 (mother's allegations of father's sexual abuse of daughter
not believed because, "You're going through a divorce, all women say that."). Id. Women's
allegations of child abuse are disbelieved as readily as their claims of being battered. Letter
from Brenda K. Jursik, Women Against Rape, Milwaukee, Wis., to Joanne Schulman,
NCOWFL staff attorney, (Oct. 18, 1982) (discussing custody in cases of alleged child sexual
abuse).
139. Thomas, supra note 74, at 157, 159-60. Women in general are discriminated
against when their financial condition is compared to the father's without consideration of the
male/female earnings gap. See SISTERHOOD Is GLOBAL, supra note 27, at 697-98. According
to Morgan, women employed full-time earn 64.7% of the median weekly income for men and
as of 1983, the female median income was $12,000, compared to $20,060 for men. Id. at 697.
See Woods, Been & Schulman, supra note 41, at 1131-32.
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the courts.1 4° In addition to suffering the economic discrimination
shared by women in general, battered women may experience additional economic hardship. First, the batterer may harass the woman
at her work place and thereby jeopardize her job.' 4 1 In addition, absenteeism or poor performance due to emotional or physical
problems arising from beatings may be cause for dismissal. 42 Finally, battered women who attempt to secure safety for themselves
and their children may lose time from work due to litigation and
related matters.
The threat of a custody suit can be used to keep a woman in a
violent relationship or to extract economic concessions from her. Protracted litigation can be used as a means to continue abusing the
woman emotionally and financially. As the following discussion will
demonstrate, the batterer has the ability to acquire continued access
to his victim through shared custody arrangements. 43
V.

STATUTORY STANDARDS FOR CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS

The modern trend in statutory standards for custody determinations is clearly towards joint custody. 144 Where a court awards joint

physical custody, the parties share both legal responsibility for the
child and physical custody.' 45 In an award of joint legal custody, on
the other hand, the parents share equally the rights and responsibilities of making decisions regarding the health, education and welfare
46
of the child, but one of the parents is granted physical custody.
While some states merely provide for joint custody as an option
when the parties agree, 47 other states allow awards of joint custody
over the objection of one parent, 48 or create a presumption of joint
custody. 49 Under these statutory schemes, joint custody can be imposed on unwilling parties.
140.

See Polikoff, supra note 31, at 237-39; Thomas, supra note 74, at 159; Woods,

Been & Schulman, supra note 41, at 1130-34.
141. NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 1; Thomas,
supra note 74, at 160; Woods, Been & Schulman, supra note 41, at 1134.
142. NCOWFL Battered Women and Custody Project, supra note 12, at 1; Thomas,

supra note 74, at 160; Woods, Been & Schulman, supra note 41, at 1134.
143. See infra notes 183-236 and accompanying text.
144. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 539, 545-46, 572-77.
145.

Id. at 542-45. See e.g., CAL. CIV.

CODE

§ 4600.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985).

146. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 542-45. See e.g.,

CAL-

CIv.

CODE

§

4600.5(d)(5) (West Supp. 1985).

147. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 548-50.
148. Id. at 546-48, 550-51.
149. Id. at 551-53.
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States that do not require joint custody by statute generally adhere to the "best interests of the child" standard1 50 in making custody determinations. 15' This formula for determining custody gives
broad discretion to the court in choosing the factors to be considered
and how a particular factor will be weighed. In applying the standard, courts appear increasingly reluctant to scrutinize a parent's
character. 52 In addition, only four states have statutes that allow a
court to consider the causes for marital breakdown in determining
custody, 153 and several states have adopted language from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act that precludes judicial consideration
of parental conduct that "does not affect his relationship to the
child.' 54 This language can be construed to exclude evidence of
spouse abuse where courts fail to recognize its effect on children.
The trend towards automatic awards of joint custody, 55 along
with greater reluctance to evaluate the relative fitness or fault of the
parties, 56 bodes ill for battered women. While no-fault divorce and
custody standards are ostensibly motivated by the desire to minimize
acrimony in family dispute settlement, 57 these statutory trends are
unrealistic to the extent that they fail to take into account the high
incidence of domestic violence involved in marital breakdown.
At least five states, however, have recognized the interrelated
nature of custody and battering. 58 While most state statutes do not
expressly recognize the relevance of wife abuse in custody disSee UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 402. See e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
(McKinney 1984-1985). For a discussion of the factors generally considered by courts in

150.

§ 240

determining what constitutes the "best interests of the child," see Foster & Freed, Child Custody (Pt. 1), 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 438-43 (1964).

151. See Memorandum from Laurie Woods, director of NCOWFL, to Joanne Schulman, NCOWFL staff attorney, (Jan. 10, 1983) (survey of child custody statutes) [hereinafter
cited as Woods Memorandum].
152.
153.

See id. at 10-12.

FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(f) (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 32-717-5 (1983);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)() (Vest Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-

06.2(6) (1983).

154. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402; Woods Memorandum, supra
note 151, at 7.
155. See supra note 144.
156. See generally Woods Memorandum, supra note 151, at 10-12.
157. See Wolff, Family Conciliation: Draft Rules for the Settlement of Family Disputes, 21 J. FAM. L. 213, 221-23, 228 (1982-83).
158. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(8) (1985); CAL CIV. CODE § 4601.5 (West 1983);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(4) (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp.
1985); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a)(6) (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.270(2)
(1984). See Arbeitman, supra note 12; Hirsch, supra note 17.
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putes, 159 these states have enacted statutes that allow or require
courts to consider evidence of spouse abuse in custody cases. In Florida, for example, legislation which became effective October 1, 1984,
amended that state's joint custody statute.160 This law requires the
court in a divorce proceeding to consider evidence of spouse abuse as
evidence of detriment to a child.16 As a result, battered women may
be able to obtain sole custody without having to prove, in each case,
16 2
the correlation between wife beating and detriment to the child.
The Florida amendment further provides that in cases involving
spouse abuse a court may, in addition to awarding sole custody to
the victim, "make such arrangements for visitation as will best protect the child and abused spouse from further harm."16 3 Implicit in
this language is recognition that both the child and the battered
spouse may require protection from the batterer and that all arrangements for visitation in such a case should be explicitly defined.1 64 Since abducting a child during visitation is not uncommon
behavior for batterers,16 5 supervised visitation may be especially important where the potential for child snatching exists. 66
Although the Florida law is the first requiring a court to consider spouse abuse as evidence of detriment to a child, other states
address the problem of custody and battering less directly. Alaska's
custody statute, for example, requires the court to consider marital
violence in determining whether to award joint custody.167 The
Alaska statute could be construed to limit consideration of marital
159. Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 3. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
160. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-13(2)(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1985). The bill originally submitted to the Florida House of Representatives would have required the court, in a dissolution

proceeding, to consider evidence of spouse abuse as prima facie evidence of detriment to a
child. Public Document No. 215-197A-2-4, Florida House of Representatives (1984). The bill

passed with the words "prima facie" deleted.
161.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§

61-13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). This is significant because

under Florida's joint custody statute, joint custody is awarded unless the court makes a finding
that "shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." Id.
162.
163.
164.

Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1.
FLA. STAT ANN. § 61-13(2)(b)(2) (Vest Supp. 1985).
Hirsch, supra note 17, at 2.

165. Thomas, supra note 74, at 168-72. Child snatching is a vehicle for further abuse of
the mother and the children. As one author notes:
Once the battered woman leaves, the batterer's hostility and violence often becomes
directed at the children, or at her through the children by a snatching. Custody and
visitation issues and incidents provide the batterer with opportunities for continued
violence and carrying out his threats of child snatching.
P, HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 15-7.
166. Thomas, supra note 74, at 168-69, 72.
167. ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(8) (1985).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss2/5

22

Keenan: Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory

19851

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CUSTODY

violence to cases where joint custody is an issue.16 8 As a result, the
statute is arguably less effective in protecting children, since the
court is not required to consider evidence of violence in a sole custody situation.16 9 The question remains open as to whether the
Alaska courts will construe the statute to allow or require consideration of evidence of battering in all custody cases, whether or not joint
custody is an issue. Furthermore, the statute does not require consideration of domestic violence in structuring visitation.
The Illinois Appellate Court, in an insightful decision, refused
to be constrained by a literal interpretation of that state's custody
statute. The court broadly construed the requirement that it consider
"physical violence or threat of physical violence by the child's potential custodian, whether directed against the child or directed against
another person but witnessed by the child,"170 in determining the
best interests of the child. Thus, in Williams v. Williams,171 the
court upheld a trial court ruling that permitted the mother to introduce evidence of a brutal beating inflicted upon her by the child's
father, despite the fact that the child had not witnessed the attack.72
In Williams, the parties were divorced during the mother's
pregnancy but cohabited after the birth. 17 3 Subsequently, the father
filed for custody and the court permitted the mother to introduce
evidence of the beating. 1 4 The father appealed the trial court's
award of custody to the mother, arguing that the court erred in considering evidence of conduct that did not directly affect the father's
relationship with the child.' 75 The issue on appeal was whether or
not the state's custody statute requires that a child witness the violence before such conduct may be considered relevant to custody. 76
In holding evidence of the beating relevant and admissible, the court
reasoned that although the child may have actually witnessed the
assault, that fact was not determinative since the child was so young
that comprehension might be limited. 7 Significantly, the court ac168. Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 3, 6.
169. Woods Memorandum, supra note 151, at 1.
170. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1980). The statute requires the
court to "determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child" while "consider[ing] all relevant factors.
... Id.
171. 104 111.App.3d 16, 432 N.E.2d 375 (1982).

172.

Id. at 17, 432 N.E.2d at 376.

173.

Id. at 17, 432 N.E.2d at 375-76.

174. Id. at 17, 432 N.E.2d at 376.
175.
176.

Id. at 17-18, 432 N.E.2d at 376.
Id. at 18-19, 432 N.E.2d at 376-77.

177.

Id. at 19, 432 N.E.2d at 377.
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knowledged that the best interests of the child might require removal

from a potentially harmful environment, regardless of the child's
awareness. 17 8 Finally, the court noted that evidence of actual harm
to the child was not a prerequisite to a finding that the child should

be removed from a harmful environment.179 The admissibility of evidence of a parent's brutality, however, should not depend on judicial
willingness to engage in activist statutory interpretation. Custody
statutes should be drafted to ensure the admissibility of evidence of
domestic violence in all cases.
Finally, two states, Kentucky and Colorado, attempt to protect

battered women by precluding the introduction of evidence of the
woman's absence from the home as tending to show instability,
abandonment, or fault.

a0

While these statutes do not address the

issue of battering as evidence probative of parental fitness, they do
prohibit consideration of a battered woman's absence from the family home where the victim has left to escape the abuse.181 While this
type of statute can alleviate some of the prejudice battered women
experience in custody litigation, 182 additional legislation is needed to
ensure that evidence of battering will be admissible and given weight
in every custody case.
178. Id.
179. Id. The court stated that while the child may actually have witnessed the assault,
that fact was "of no import, for the child was of such tender age as to preclude full comprehension of the event." Id. Furthermore, the court emphasized that "the best interests of the
child may necessitate removing the child from [a] potentially harmful environment irrespective
of the child's state of knowledge." Id. (citing In re Padiak, 101 Ill. App. 3d 306, 427 N.E.2d
1372 (1981)).
The attack on the wife in Williams was especially brutal. The husband beat, raped, and
confined the victim for several days after inflicting injuries that required surgery and hospitalization. Id. at 18, 432 N.E.2d at 376. The court may have felt compelled under the circumstances to construe the statute broadly. Restrictive statutory language might not be so easily
overcome in a case involving less shocking facts.
180. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124(4) (1984) provides:
If a parent is absent or leaves home because of spouse abuse by the other parent,
such absence or leaving shall not be a factor in determining the best interests of the
child. For the purpose of this subsection (4), "spouse abuse" means the proven
threat of or infliction of physical pain or injury by a spouse on the other parent.
Id. Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.270(2) (1984) provides:
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child. The abandonment of the family residence by a custodial
party shall not be considered where said party was physically harmed or was seriously threatened with physical harm by his or her spouse, when such harm or threat
of harm was causally related to the abandonment.
Id. See also Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 6.
181. Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 6.
182. See supra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
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VI.

DANGERS TO BATTERED WOMEN IN MODERN CUSTODY
TRENDS

Modern trends in family law are fostering a treacherous situation for battered women."' 3 The major areas of concern for battered
women include statutory presumptions of joint custody, 84 certain
provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,' moving
restrictions in custody decrees,"8 " and mandatory mediation of family
disputes. 87 The pitfalls for battered women inherent in each of the
statutory schemes are magnified when battering is not considered as
evidence of unfitness for custody.
A.

Joint Custody is Inappropriate Where Parents Are Hostile

The premise underlying joint custody - that children benefit
from a relationship with both parents - does not lead inevitably to
the conclusion that maximizing father-child contact in the post divorce situation is an absolute goal. While the maintenance of an

ongoing relationship with both parents is recognized as a factor contributing to the successful post divorce adjustment of children, 8 8 the

converse is true for children who have been exposed to a parent who
abused the children or their mother, either physically or psychologically.' 8 9 Furthermore, joint custody requires close contact, cooperation and decision making, 90° and is therefore inappropriate in cases
involving hostile parents. 191 Shared custody arrangements provide
183.

Thomas, supra note 74, at 143; Woods, Been & Schulman, supra note 41, at 1133-

44.
184. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133 at 551-53.
185. See infra notes 200-21 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 222-36 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
188. Wallerstein, Summary of Past and Current Research and Findings (Feb. 1984)
(reprinted by NCOWFL) at 1-2. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 556.
189. See Wallerstein, supra note 188, at 2. Wallerstein concludes that "children who
were able to maintain geographical distance from a psychiatrically disturbed parent greatly
improved and in fact experienced a developmental spurt during the first year following the
marital breakdown." Id. Wallerstein also noted that "the departure of a parent who has been
physically or psychologically brutal or demeaning to the child or [other] parent provides great
relief." Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: The Psychological Tasks of the Child, 53 AMER. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY

230, 237 (April 1983).

190.

Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable Alternative?, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHILD CUSTODY 383, 389 (1978).
191. In Blake v. Blake, the court noted that "Itihe parties. . . have demonstrated great
antagonism toward each other. For that reason alone, joint custody. . . is inappropriate." 106
A.D.2d 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879, 880 (1984). See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 570;
Bodenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation, and the Right to Move, I FAM. ADVOC. 18, 19 (1978).
See also Neely, supra note 40, at 183-84 (distinguishing voluntary from court-ordered joint
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the batterer with ongoing access to his victim and expose the children to continued harm from violence and hostility between the parents.19 2 For these reasons, courts should not award joint custody in
situations involving domestic violence. Unfortunately, as more states
adopt joint custody, this type of arrangement is decreed more fre19 3
quently in inappropriate situations.
In In re Marriage of Weidner,19 4 the Supreme Court of Iowa
recently emphasized that joint custody should not be imposed on unwilling parties, even though Iowa law allows the court to award joint
custody over one party's objection.1 95 The Weidner Court sustained a
trial court's award of sole custody to a mother,1 96 reasoning that
joint custody was inappropriate where the parents were mutually
hostile and the father, in particular, was aggressively hostile towards
the mother and engaged in behavior that disrupted the children's
daily lives.19 7 Unfortunately, most states do not have a domestic violence exception in their joint custody statutes,198 and many judges
still refuse to give evidence of spouse abuse significant weight when
making custody determinations.1 99 Under these circumstances,
women and children are jeopardized by the joint custody trend.
B.

The UCCJA: Mixed Blessing for Battered Women

The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) has
been adopted in every state 00 as part of a nationwide effort to deter
child snatching and to resolve competing jurisdictional problems in
interstate custody litigation.2 0 1 While these goals are important, several of the provisions of the UCCJA can be problematic for battered
women who leave a state with their children in order to escape the
batterer. o2
custody).
192. Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 555-56.
193. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 2-7.
194. 338 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1983).
195. Id. at 358-59. See IowA CODE ANN. § 598.41(2) (West Supp. 1985).
196. 338 N.W.2d at 359.
197. id. at 357.
198. Arbeitman, supra note 12, at 3.
199. See supra note 12.
200. P.HOFF, 3. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 1-3. Texas and
Massachusetts were the last states to adopt the UCCJA. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.51
(Vernon Supp. 1985); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 209B § I (West Supp. 1985).
201, See S. KATZ, CHILD SNATCHING: THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO THE ABDUCTION OF
CHILDREN 11-15 (1981).
202. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 3-15 - 3-16.
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The jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA may jeopardize

the safety of a battered woman by requiring her to litigate in the
forum where the batterer lives and files suit. Section 3 of the

UCCJA grants jurisdiction to render a custody decree to the state
where a child has last lived for six months or more. 03 Thus, a battered woman who flees her home for safety reasons may be required
to return to her home state for a hearing on custody. 0 4 When this
occurs, the victim is once again exposed to the batterer and incurs

additional expenses if she wants to avoid the possibility of a home
state decree awarding custody to the batterer upon her failure to
appear.20 5 Since each state under the UCCJA is required to give full

faith and credit to the decree of another state exercising jurisdiction
pursuant to its provisions, 20 the home state decree, issued by de-

fault, would be enforceable in the state to which the victim has
20 7

fled.

This situation can be prevented when the home state voluntarily
waives its right to exercise jurisdiction.2 0 8 The Indiana Court of Appeals, in In re Cline, 20 9 ruled that an Indiana trial court was correct
in doing just that. In that case, the court held that the trial court
had properly deferred jurisdiction to a California court where a bat210
tered woman had fled with her child from Indiana to California.
The Indiana trial court had declined to exercise jurisdiction because

it found that California was the more convenient forum, 21' and be203. U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(1)(i) (1968). See S. KATZ, supra note 201, at 3, 35.
204. This could happen, for example, where a battered woman leaves California, her
home state, and California subsequently exercises jurisdiction for custody purposes under
U.C.C.J.A. § 3(a)(1) (1968). This section confers jurisdiction on a court in the state which had
been the child's home state within six months before commencement of the proceedings when
one parent removes the child from that state and the other parent remains. Id. Since California requires participation in mandatory mediation in a custody dispute, CAL. CIv. CODE §
4607(a) (West Supp. 1985), the battered woman would have to return to California for this
purpose. A California attorney who has handled several cases where this has happened believes
that this situation is not uncommon. Telephone interview with Michelle Welsh, private attorney in Pacific Grove, California (Mar. 1, 1985) (record on file at Hofstra Law Review). See
U.C.C.J.A. § 11 (1968) (appearance of parties and child).
205. U.C.C.J.A. § 12 (1968) (res judicata effect of custody decree).
206. See id. at §§ 12-15 (recognition, enforcement, and modification of out-of-state
decrees).
207. Id.
208. See infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
209. 433 N.E.2d 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
210. Id. at 53-54.
211. Id. The court considered the mother's allegations of battering and the fact that she
fled to her parents' home, California's desire to extradite the father on criminal charges involving his attempt to take the child away from his mother in California, and the presence of
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cause the California court was willing to hear the matter.212 The appellate court, apparently sensitive to the plight of the battered
spouse, agreed that there were sufficient reasons for the trial court to
determine that California was the more appropriate forum.21 a
Waiver of jurisdiction, however, is within the court's discretion, and
less progressive courts may more often force the fleeing victim to
return to the home state for litigation.21 4
The UCCJA's emergency jurisdiction provision,21 5 which provides an alternative basis for a state to exercise jurisdiction, similarly
fails to address the needs of battered women. This section of the Act
allows a court that would not otherwise have jurisdiction to exercise
jurisdiction when it is necessary to protect the child. This provision
has been narrowly drafted and construed and the courts have generally been reluctant to invoke emergency jurisdiction. 26 To be more
effective, the UCCJA emergency jurisdiction provision should provide explicitly that a battered woman who flees a state in a good
faith attempt to escape her batterer will be entitled to relief in the
state where she settles with her children.217 Such a provision would
require the state that the battered woman leaves to defer jurisdiction
to her new home state. The batterer, rather than the victim, would
then absorb the costs of litigating in a distant forum, and the woman
would not have to again risk exposure to the batterer.
Finally, the pleading requirements of the UCCJA create an additional area of concern for battered women, since this section requires all the parties to disclose their addresses. 2 8 The safety of a
hospital records in California that were relevant to the mother's fitness. Id. at 54. See
U.C.CJ.A. § 7 (1968) (defining inconvenient forum under the Act).
212. 433 N.E.2d at 53.
213. Id. at 54.
214. See supra note 204. See also P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL,
supra note 7, at 3-15 - 3-17 (discussing the problematic nature of jurisdiction under the
U.C.C.J.A. in cases involving battered women fleeing home states).
215. U.C.CJ.A. § 3(a)(3) (1968) provides that an otherwise competent court has jurisdiction to make a custody determination if the child is physically present in the state and has
been abandoned or if "it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected [or dependent]." Id.
216.

P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK &

J. O'DANIEL,

supra note 7, at 3-16. See S.

KATZ, supra note 201, at 19.
217. Such a provision would be consistent with the purposes of the Act. First, there
would be less likelihood of a jurisdictional conflict. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction by a
state that the victim moves to would not encourage child snatching or forum shopping, since
battered women flee in order to secure safety for themselves and their children.
218. U.C.C.J.A. § 9(a) (1968) (requiring information under oath to be submitted to the
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battered woman is jeopardized when the batterer can locate her
through this public record.219 New York has resolved this problem in
its version of the UCCJA220 by providing for the confidentiality of
the addresses of battered women and of shelters.22 ' The potential difficulties for battered women in specific provisions of the UCCJA illustrate-hat even remedial statutes can fail to realistically consider
the needs of domestic violence victims in the custody context.
C. Moving Restrictions in Custody Decrees
The incorporation of moving restrictions into custody decrees,

requiring custodial parents to remain in a certain geographical area,
is another area of concern for- battered women.22 2 Consistent with

the trend emphasizing joint parenting responsibilities and privileges, 223 some courts have imposed moving restrictions on custodial

parents. 224 In addition, some states have anti-removal statutes 225 that
have the same effect.
Even in the absence of a statutory or explicit requirement in the

decree, courts may find that the non-custodial parent's visitation
rights require the custodial parent to remain in a specific geographic

area. Thus, one court has ruled that the non-custodial parent's right
to free access and liberal visitation created an implicit restriction on
the custodial parent's right to move.226
At least one court, however, has refused to impose such a re-

striction on the custodial parent.227 In a well-reasoned decision, the
court).
219. P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 6-6 - 6-7.
220. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 75-j (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
221. Id. See P. HOFF, J. SCHULMAN, A. VOLENIK & J. O'DANIEL, supra note 7, at 6-7.
222. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 564-66 (discussing the implications of no
removal provisions for battered women).
223. See supra notes 144-50 & 190-93 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., Entwistle v. Entwistle, 61 A.D.2d 380, 402 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1978);
Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ryan v. Ryan, 300 Minn.
244, 219 N.W.2d 912 (1974). See Bodenheimer, supra note 191, at 19-21 (questioning
whether the right to frequent visitation by non-custodial parents should be enforced by restrictions on custodial parent's right to move).
225. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-2 (West Supp. 1985-1986), which provides that
children of divorced parents should not be removed from the state without consent of the noncustodial parent, "unless the court, upon cause shown, shall order otherwise." Id.; Rosen, Custodial Parent's Rights Broadened by N.J. Ruling, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 3, 1984, at 10, col. 1.
226. Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So. 2d 27, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). For a discussion of Giachetti, comparison to other states' decisions and statutes, and articulation of the
problems inherent in moving restrictions, see Gersten, ParentalAccess and Residence Restrictions: Giachetti v. Giachetti, 56 FLA. BJ. 869 (1982).
227. Hale v. Hale, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 812, 429 N.E.2d 340 (1981).
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court in Hale v. Hale 28 recognized that the desirability of frequent
and continuing contact between the non-custodial parent and the
children was not dispositive of the custodial parent's request to move
with the children to a distant state.229 The court emphasized that the
well-being of the custodial parent should be considered in a determination of whether removal was appropriate, 230 and that the best interests of the child are interwoven with the best interests of the custodial parent. 231 Removal was allowed in this case where the mother
made a good faith
request to move to another state to pursue a ca232
reer opportunity.
In situations involving battered women, moving restrictions are
particularly inappropriate. As the Supreme Court of Iowa noted in
In re Weidner,233 proximity may increase hostility, and therefore distance between the parties may be desirable.234 Implicit in both the
Hale and Weidner opinions is the view that the non-custodial parent's strong interest in visitation may be overridden by a number of
other concerns, including factors that relate directly to the welfare of
the custodial parent. 235 In a case involving domestic violence, the
emotional and physical well-being of the battered woman should
take priority over the batterer's interest in access to his children.
Moving restrictions are dangerous to battered women who retain custody to the extent that they assure proximity and access to
the batterer 36 Where a court excludes evidence of battering, the
potential for the imposition of moving restrictions on battered
women is clear. Even where evidence of battering is admitted, if the
court considers the desirability of continuing contact between the
non-custodial parent and the children as dispositive of the removal
rights of the custodial parent, a battered woman may be required to
remain in the same geographical area as her abuser. In such a case,
the non-custodial batterer is assured access to his children and to the
victim while retaining the right to move himself, if he wishes. The
battered woman, however, may not move even to escape beating, if
228. Id. See Gersten, supra note 226, at 871.
229. 12 Mass. App. Ct. at 815-19, 429 N.E.2d at 342-45.
230. Id. at 815, 429 N.E.2d at 342.
231. Id. at 817-20, 429 N.E.2d at 343-45.
232. Id. at 813-14, 429 N.E.2d at 341-42.
233. 338 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1983).
234. Id. at 357.
235. These factors would logically include the economic, emotional and physical wellbeing of the custodial parent.
236. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 564-66.
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she wishes to retain custody.

D.

Mediation is Inappropriatein Cases Involving Spouse Abuse

Mediation, particularly participation in mandatory mediation as
a precondition to opportunity to be heard on a motion for custody or
divorce,237 is another developing trend in family law that is potentially hazardous for battered women.238 Despite findings that arrest
is the best deterrent to domestic violence, 3 9 the trend towards di-

verting domestic violence complaints from the courts into mediation
programs appears to be gaining popularity.240 California, for example, requires mediation in all cases involving child custody, including
those involving child or spouse abuse.24 1

The impetus for mediation arises as much from the inability
and unwillingness of the judicial system to handle the volume of conflicts that arise, 242 as it does from a misguided popular belief that

domestic disputes are especially appropriate for resolution through
mediation. 243 The primary goals in any domestic violence situation
237. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1985).
238. Address by Joanne Schulman at 14th National Conference on Women and Law,
Mediation and Battered Women Panel, in Wash., D.C. (April 9, 1983) (reprinted by
NCOWFL). Ms. Schulman quotes from a New York Times article setting out the proposition
that "arrest is the best way to protect battered women from further abuse." Id. (quoting Boffey, Domestic Violence: Study FavorsArrest, N.Y. Times, April 5, 1983, at Cl, col. I). See
Hart, supra note 39; Lefcourt, supra note 122, at 266-69; Lerman, supra note 26, at 71-72;
Cohen, Mediation in Divorce: Boon or Bane? (paper presented at New York University
School of Law at the Conference on Women and Mediation (Jan. 21-22, 1984)) (reprinted by
NCOWFL); Nichols, Issues to Consider Regarding Mediataion of Custody (presentation at
New York University School of Law at the Conference on Women and Mediation, Jan. 16,
1984) (reprinted by NCOWFL).
239. Boffey, supra note 238; Jocoby, Hers, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1983, at C2, col. 1;
Mall, Arrests Found to Deter Wife Beaters, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1983, pt. VII, at 10, col. 1;
Arrest May Be Deterrent in Domestic Violence, Study Shows, N.Y. Times, May 30, 1984, at

C4, col. 1. The

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE REPORT,

supra note 5, at 22 recommends

that "[c]onsistent with state law . . . every law enforcement agency should establish arrest as
the preferred response in cases of family violence." Id.
240. Norman, Program Gets Bad Reviews, Peninsula Times, July 3, 1980, at B1, col. 1.
See Wayne, Mediation and Confidentiality, (paper presented at New York University School
of Law at the conference on Women and Mediation (Jan. 21-22, 1984)) (reprinted by
NCOWFL).
241. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4607(a) (West Supp. 1985).
242. Lefcourt, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Family Disputes, N.Y.L.J., March 29,
1983, at 1, col. 2. Lefcourt quotes Chief Justice Burger, recommending that divorce and custody matters be settled by mediation in order to relieve the caseload of the courts. Id.
243. Mediation is seen as a remedy to court overcrowding and as a "civilized way to
settle family problems." Berg & Pearlman, supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis in original); Boffey,
supra note 238.
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are providing safety and economic survival for the victims. 2 44 Mediation subverts these goals to the goals of the mediation process which
emphasizes "communication, reasonable discourse, and joint resolu-

tion of adverse interests ' 24 5 outside the courtroom.
Imposing mediation on battered women indicates a failure to
appreciate the unequal power relationship between a batterer and his

victim. 246 In a custody dispute, a battered woman, already susceptible to pressure to make economic concessions in exchange for
favorable custody arrangements,247 comes to the negotiations with
unequal bargaining power, 248 and no legal representation,2 49 and is
expected to negotiate with her batterer "at arm's length" while the

criminal nature of the batterer's conduct is overlooked. 50 Ina society where a battered woman must overcome multiple obstacles to

arrive at the point of terminating the ties that bind her to the batterer, mandatory mediation imposes yet another burden on the vic-

tim of domestic violence.
VII.

THE NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM

In view of the high percentage of all family disputes that involve
244. Lefcourt, supra note 122, at 268.
245. Id. Hart, supra note 39, at 11-12, compares the disparate goals of mediators and
battered women's advocates. See generally, Lerman, supra note 26.
246. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 23. See supra notes
117-42 and accompanying text.
247. Richard Neely, Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and
Professor of Economics at the University of Charleston, describes how he, as a young, small
town lawyer, helped a client who had no desire to actually obtain custody, use the threat of a
custody fight to obtain economic concessions from the client's wife. Neely, supra note 40, at
177-78. Neely concludes that
[a] parent concerned with paying as little as possible can use the threat of a custody
fight ... as a lever during settlement negotiations. The result is that one parent typically the father - winds up paying less in child support than the needs of the
...children warrant, while the other parent - typically the mother - is forced to
scrape by on inadequate support, a problem exacerbated by the generally lower
earning power of women.
Id. at 168. See Hart, supra note 39, at 10-11 (batterers force property and support concessions
from their wives in exchange for promises of safety for the victims).
248. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
249. See Cohen, supra note 238 (discussing the need for "vigorous enlightened advocacy" to protect women's rights in family disputes); Schulman & Woods, Legal Advocacy vs.
Mediation in Family Law, in THE WOMEN's ADVOCATE,at 3, 4 (July 1983) (a newsletter of
the NCOWFL).
250. Lerman, supra note 26, at 84, 91-92. For a discussion of why mediation is an "inappropriate law enforcement response in family violence incidents," see ATrORNEY GENERAL'S
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 22-25.
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domestic violence,251 legislation in the family law area should be implemented only after careful consideration of its potential impact on
battered women. Legislators should question whether mandating arrangements such as joint custody, mediation, and restrictions on the

right to move is realistic or desirable.
In the custody litigation context, a presumption in favor of the
admissibility of evidence of spouse abuse is appropriate. The Florida

statute, requiring evidence of spouse abuse to be considered as evidence of detriment to a child,252 is a good beginning, but reform is
still needed. A more effective statute would provide that evidence of
spouse abuse creates a presumption of detriment to a child. Exten-

sive documentation of the negative effects of wife beating on children253 provides a sufficient basis for such a presumption.
A statutory presumption of detriment to a child arising from
spouse abuse can help to limit the use of custody litigation as a battering weapon. In initial custody litigation, there are generally no

clear guidelines for allocating the burden of proof. 254 The presumption that battering is detrimental to children may actually lower the

number of custody suits started .for harassment purposes, since the
batterer will be on notice that evidence 25
of5 his violence will be both
admissible and given substantial weight.
Finally, presumptions that are reality based impart order and
some measure of fairness to domestic dispute resolution. 256 Since ju251. See supra note 7; Schulman & Pitt, supra note 133, at 555.
252. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
253. See supra notes 73-116 and accompanying text.
254. Katz, supra note 30, at 343-44. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46(b)-56
(West Supp. 1985); N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 240 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). When custody
statutes are gender neutral, neither party has an evidentiary advantage. Katz, supra note 30,
at 344. Presumptions, such as the now discarded maternal preference, shift the burden of
proof. Katz, supra note 30, at 344. The newly articulated primary caretaker presumption also
results in burden shifting. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
255. One commentator notes that "[l]itigation is less frequent when there is a clear
preference for one parent, and, in most cases, the avoidance of litigation itself is in the best
interests of the child." Katz, supra note 30, at 348. Katz discusses the importance of the
allocation of the burden of proof in custody litigation:
Litigation is a contest between adversaries, and custody is no exception. As in all
contests, there should be rules that tell each contestant what he or she must do in
order to "win" and who "wins" in case of a tie. The allocation of the burden of
proof is such a rule and so are rebuttable presumptions. Such rules impart order and
predictability into the judicial decision making process. Litigants as a result start
with some notion of their chances of success; they can make choices accordingly.
Id. at 343. See also Uviller, supra note 30, at 126 (elimination of the maternal presumption
removed an effective deterrent to litigation).
256. See Birzon, Evidentiary Problems for the Matrimonial Lawyer, 16 FAm. L. REV. 5
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dicial decision-making is particularly difficult in the custody area,
the operation of a rational presumption can facilitate the process,
thus preserving the resources of the court and the parties. A presumption of detriment to children from battering will relieve the victims of the evidentiary burden of proving the negative effects of violence on children in each case. 56 When the court's choice is between
custody to a batterer or to the victim, the battered woman is the
preferred custodian. 59
CONCLUSION

Custody statutes are appropriate vehicles for stemming the tide
of domestic violence in this country. At least one court has explicitly
recognized that child custody and spouse abuse are interrelated areas
and may properly be the subjects of one statute.260 In holding that a
state domestic violence statute designed to protect victims of abuse 26 l
could properly provide for ex-parte orders of protection including
temporary custody and support provisions,262 the Supreme Court of
Missouri in Williams v. Williams 263 acknowledged that orders relating to custody and support may be necessary as part of the effort to
aid domestic violence victims.2 64 The trial court had invalidated the
statute as unconstitutional because of its impact on the father's important personal rights, 65 including his property interest in his home
and his liberty interest in the custody of his children. 66 The higher
court reversed, holding the statute a reasonable exercise of the
state's police power and necessary to secure the protection of victims
of abuse and to prevent future abuse. 67 Regarding the parents' ad(1984). Birzon notes that "[tihe ability to reasonably forecast evidentiary rulings which may
determine the direction or ultimate result of a case remains of foremost importance ....
Id.
See also Uviller, supra note 30, at 114-23 (discussing the unfairness of sex neutral standards
that fail to consider the disadvantages mothers suffer in competing for custody with fathers on
an "equal" basis).
257. Birzon, supra note 256.
258. Hirsch, supra note 17, at 1.
259. Thomas, supra note 74, at 146-47, discusses the characteristics of battered women
that make them preferred parents over batterers. See infra notes 263-68 and accompanying
text.
260. Williams v. Williams, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982).
261. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.010-.085 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
262. Williams, 626 S.W.2d at 228-29.
263. 626 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. 1982).
264. Id. at 229, 230-32.
265. Id. at 229.
266. Id. at 230.
267. Id. at 229-32.
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mittedly equal interest in the custody of the children, the court concluded that when domestic violence is involved, the268rights of the
abuser may be subverted to the rights of the victim.
Although the Missouri case upheld the inclusion of custody provisions in a domestic violence statute, the court's reasoning is equally
relevant to the issue of domestic violence provisions in custody statutes. Recognition of the interrelated nature of custody and battering
is the first step towards structuring a rationally based family law
system. Custody statutes and determinations should be structured to
protect women and children from further harm, even where restriction of a parent's contact with the children is necessary to accommodate this goal. Furthermore, custody statutes that properly consider
evidence of violence can serve a remedial purpose. Family violence is
a national tragedy with devastating consequences for society. Legislators and the judiciary have the ability to structure custody provisions that will deter this crime.
Linda R. Keenan

268.

Id. at 230-31.
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